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What Constitutes Covered Employment Within
the Contemplation of the Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Act
by Harry Kottler*
W ORKMEN'S COMPENSATION acts have been generally inter-
preted in three ways: first, as the substitution of a statutory
tort for a common law tort; second, as the regulation of the rela-
tionship between employer and employee, which is primarily
contractual in character; third, as the creation of a new statutory
relation between master and servant, the chief incident of which
is to impose upon the master financial responsibility for certain
risks of service.' While these represent the underlying legal
philosophies in the enactment of workmen's compensation laws,
the desiderata in enactment of the laws vary from state to state,
and for that reason the acts of the various states are as varied in
their provisions and coverage as is the imagination of man. In
some states only "hazardous" occupations are covered.2 In
others only specified occupations are covered, the coverage seem-
ing to bear no relation to the hazards of the occupation, with the
inclusions or exclusions based, very likely, upon the historical
development of these acts rather than upon any definitive con-
cept of an underlying philosophy or desiderata.
It is at once apparent, therefore, that to undertake an analysis
of the coverage contemplated by the workmen's compensation
acts of each of the states would be an herculean task, and would
serve no useful purpose to Ohio lawyers. This article, therefore,
is limited to the coverage contemplated by the Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Law. Decisions of other jurisdictions are cited as
precedents only where those states have corollary provisions, or
where the decisions of the courts rendering them have a direct
bearing upon the effect of the Ohio law, as, for example, deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court.
The purpose of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act is
"to require as a matter of justice that injuries to workmen sus-
* Mr. Kottler is associated in the general practice of law with the
Cleveland, Ohio law firm of Daus and Schwenger, and is pursuing graduate
law study at Western Reverse University.
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tained in the course of their employment shall be regarded as a
charge upon the business in which they are engaged, and com-
pensation made therefor." 3 The language of the Ohio law and
the decisions of the courts disclose a purpose to construe the act
so as to extend its coverage broadly,4 and in the administration
of the'act the same broad and liberal construction appears to be
given operation. Underlying this approach seems to be the de-
sire to aid and encourage workers, so essential to our highly in-
dustrialized state.
I. The Employment Relationship
Under the Ohio law, compensation is payable to the injured
workman, if living, or to his dependents if he is killed, but only
if he comes within the definition of the terms "employee," "work-
man" or "operative" under the provisions of the act; and only
then if his employer is, likewise, amenable to the provisions of
the act. The purview of these definitions and the limitations
thereof are hereinafter discussed. In addition to the above two
qualifications, the injury to the workman must have been in-
curred "in the course of his employment." What constitutes
"course of employment" is, however, beyond the scope of this
article and will not be discussed herein.5
The definition of "employer" within the meaning of the act
is set forth in Section 1465-60, Ohio General Code, 6 and that of
'Industrial Commission v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 190 N. E. 400 (1934);
Prendergast v. Industrial Commission, 136 Ohio St. 535, 27 N. E. 2d 235(1940).
'Industrial Commission v. Rogers, 34 Ohio App. 196, 170 N. E. 600 (1929);
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 44 Ohio App. 539 (1933).
'For the rules defining "course of employment," see Outland v. Industrial
Commission, 59 Ohio App. 427, 18 N. E. 2d 499 (1937).
'Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-60. The following shall constitute employers
subject to the provisions of this act:
1. The state and each county, city, township, incorporated village
and school district therein.
2. Every person, firm and private corporation, including any public
service corporation, that has in its service three or more workmen or
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same estab-
lishment under any contract or [of] hire, express or implied, oral or
written. Any member of a partnership, firm or association, who reg-
ularly performs manual labor in or about a mine, factory or other
establishment, but not including a household establishment, shall be
considered a workman or operative in determining whether or not
such person, firm or private corporation, or public service corporation
has in its service three or more workmen. The income derived from
such labor shall be reported to the commission as part of the payroll
of such employer, and such member shall thereupon be entitled to all
the benefits of an employee as defined in this act.
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"employee," "workman" or "operative" is contained in Section
1465-61, Ohio General Code.7 These two sections are to be con-
strued in pari materia8
With respect to employers, the act is made applicable to
specified public employers, and to all private employers, includ-
ing public service corporations, with certain exceptions and
limitations, which are hereinafter discussed. The applicability
of the act to employees depends upon two things; (1) the exist-
ence of the employer-employee relationship, and (2) the nature
and character of the employment.
(a) Existence of the Employer-Employee Relationship:
Under the scheme of the Ohio act an injured workman is
not entitled to compensation if, at the time of his injury, the rela-
'Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-61. The term "employee," "workman" and
"operative" as used in this act shall be construed to mean:
1. Every person in the service of the state, or of any county, city,
township, incorporated village or school district therein, including reg-
ular members of lawfully constituted police and fire departments of
cities and villages, and executive officers of boards of education, under
any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
except any elected official of the state, or any county, city, township, or
incorporated village, or members of boards of education. Provided that
nothing in this act shall apply to police or firemen in cities where the
injured policemen or firemen are eligible to participate in any police-
men's or firemen's pension funds which are now or hereafter may be
established and maintained by municipal authority under existing laws,
unless the amount of the pension funds provided by municipal taxation
and paid to such police and firemen shall be less than they would have
received had the municipality no such pension funds provided by law;
in which event such police and firemen shall be entitled to receive the
regular state compensation provided for police and firemen in munici-
palities where no policemen's or firemen's pension funds have been
created under the law; less, however, the sum or sums received by
the said policemen or firemen from said pension funds provided by
municipal taxation, and the sum or sums so paid to said policemen or
firemen from said pensions shall be certified to the industrial commis-
sion of Ohio by the treasurer or other officer controlling such pension
funds.
2. Every person in the service of any person, firm, or private cor-
poration, including any public service corporation, employing three or
more workmen or operatives regularly in the same business, or in or
about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or
implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, but not including
any person whose employment is but casual and not in the usual course
of trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.
'State ex rel. Bettman v. Christen, 128 Ohio St. 56, 190 N. E. 233 (1934);
Industrial Commission v. Rogers, 34 Ohio App. 196 (1929); Industrial Com-
mission v. Pora, 100 Ohio St. 218, 125 N. E. 662 (1919); Industrial Commis-
sion v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38 (1921); Industrial Commission
v. Lewis, 125 Ohio St. 296, 181 N. E. 136 (1932).
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tion of employer and employee did not exist, or if the workman
were not under an "appointment or contract of hire." 9
For example, in Industrial Commission v. Bateman,' a clerk
employed by the City of Hamilton was discharged. He appealed
to the civil service commission for reinstatement. While in
attendance at the commission's hearing he tripped on a rug and
was injured, the injury causing his death eight months later.
Although the hearing before the commission resulted in his re-
instatement, compensation was denied on the ground that at the
time of sustaining his injuries the relationship of employer and
employee did not exist. The court further held that the rein-
statement did not reach back to the date of the unlawful dis-
charge.
The test for the determination of the existence of the em-
ployer-employee relationship was promulgated by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Coviello v. Industrial Commission, 1 wherein the
court held that "the controlling question in determining whether
the relationship was that of employer and employee is the one of
pay." 12 Thus, there must be a "contract of hire," express or im-
plied, under which there is an obligation that the person denomi-
nated the employer pay the person employed. Absent this ob-
ligation, the relationship cannot exist.
In the Coviello case, the claimant entered into a contract to
lease a taxicab at a stipulated, unconditional rental per day, with
no duty to account for fares collected from its operation. Printed
rules setting forth certain directions to be followed were given
to the driver. These included courtesy and neatness of appear-
ance, reports to be made to the cab company at its nearest stand
upon discharge of passengers, immediate reports of accidents,
prompt response to calls, wearing of a uniform cap, and posses-
sion and study of a city street directory. There were require-
ments as to conduct, manner of driving, and other regulations,
which, it appears, were in the main a statement of the city
(Cleveland) ordinance requirements. The driver was not lim-
ited to any zone or designated section of the city, nor was he re-
quired to return to any particular place. The contract further
provided that the driver was "not to be considered as an em-
'Industrial Commission v. Bateman, 126 Ohio St. 279, 185 N. E. 50 (1933).
10 Ibid.
"129 Ohio St. 589, 196 N. E. 661 (1935).
"Id. at 592.
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ployee of the cab company," but merely "as a hirer of a taxicab,"
and the driver agreed that he would not make any claim for
compensation against the cab company as an employee.
Brushing aside all other factors as irrelevant, the court held
that the existence of the employer-employee relationship re-
volved solely about the question of the duty of the alleged em-
ployer to pay compensation for the services rendered. Finding
that no such obligation existed, the claim was denied.'8
The Coviello case was decided after the Bateman case, but
applying the doctrine of the Coviello case to the Bateman case, it
may well be argued that if the claimant is unlawfully discharged
and retroactive compensation awarded for the interim period to
his reinstatement, the local government was under an obligation
to pay wages to such an employee during that time, and, there-
fore, the unlawful suspension did not obviate the employer-
employee relationship. This argument may well avail if a situ-
ation similar to that of the Bateman case arises again.
"In determining whether or not the employer-employee relationship existed,
the court said, at p. 593: "The payment of the amount stipulated for the
use of the taxicab is not contingent upon earnings-not conditioned upon
business done or fares collected. If the rental charges were calculated upon
a percentage basis whereby an accounting of fares collected was required,
the arrangement might be construed to be one for payment of the driver
upon the basis of a percentage of the earnings of the taxicab; but, being
for a fixed sum per day for the use of the taxicab, it is by its express terms
an absolute and unconditional obligation to pay for the use of the taxicab,
regardless of earnings. There being no claim that the terms of the contract
in that respect were in anywise avoided or evaded in practical operation,
it is impossible to make it a 'contract for hire.'"
Prior to the Coviello case, the Ohio Supreme Court expressed some
doubts about the doctrine of compensation constituting the determinative
factor. In Industrial Commission v. Shaner, 127 Ohio St. 366, 188 N. E. 559
(1933), the court denied compensation to an appraiser in a replevin suit
on the ground that receipt of compensation by the claimant depended upon
the realization of costs in the action. The court said, at p. 368: "The general
rule is that the matter of compensation is not usually decisive of the re-
lationship of employer and employee, but the manner and source of pay-
ment for services is a circumstance entitled to weight in a case of doubt
and may sometimes determine the question."
In spite of the court's doubts, it felt compelled to distinguish the Shaner
case from its earlier decision of Industrial Commission v. Rogers, 122 Ohio
St. 134, 171 N. E. 35 (1929), where compensation was awarded to a juror
injured while so serving. The court there granted compensation, pointing
out that a juror was under an appointment of hire by the county, and re-
ceived compensation no matter what might be the result of his services.
The distinction drawn by the court seems tenuous at best.
The Coviello case, then, is the ultimate resolution of the problem and
a final, firm stand by the Ohio Supreme Court on the rule to be applied in
determining the existence of the employer-employee relationship.
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The Coviello case was followed in the recent case of Drexler
v. Labay,1 where an action was brought on the ground of com-
mon-law negligence by a sixteen year old boy who was engaged
by defendant's employee to help extricate a large truck from
soft ground. In so doing, plaintiff was injured. The defense
raised to this action was that plaintiff was an employee of de-
fendant and should have sought recovery under the workmen's
compensation act. The court held that there was not an em-
ployer-employee relationship between the parties because de-
fendant's employee had no right to hire the plaintiff; and there
was not, therefore, any "contract of hire" essential to establishing
the relationship. Plaintiff was, therefore, permitted to recover. 15
The Drexler case serves to make a point which should be
here noted; namely, that when the right of an injured workman
to compensation is barred under the act, all of his rights to re-
covery under the common-law are preserved. The Act pro-
vides,16 therefore, that employers who are not amenable under
the act, as for example, if they have less than three employees,
may elect to pay premiums into the state insurance fund and
" 155 Ohio St. 244, 98 N. E. 2d 410 (1951).
"See also: Krull v. Triangle Dairy Co., 59 Ohio App. 107, 17 N. E. (2d) 291(1937); Cloverdale Dairy Co. v. Briggs, 131 Ohio St. 261, 2 N. E. 2d 592
(1936).
"
6Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-71:
"Any employer who employs less than three workmen or operatives
regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
who shall pay into the state insurance fund the premiums provided by
this act, shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or
by statute, save as hereinafter provided, for injuries or death of any
such employe, wherever occurring, during the period covered by such
premiums, provided the injured employe has remained in his service
with notice that his employer has paid into the state insurance fund
the premiums provided by this act; the continuation in the service of
such employer with such notice shall be deemed a waiver by the em-
ploye of his right of action as aforesaid.
"Any person who employs one or more workmen, operatives or
servants who are not employes within the classification defined in sec-
tions 1465-60 and 1465-61 of the General Code, who shall pay into the
state insurance fund the premiums provided by this act shall not be
liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute, for injuries
or death of any such employes, wherever occurring, during the period
covered by such premiums, provided the injured employe has remained
in the service of such person with notice that his employer has paid
into the state insurance fund the premiums provided by this act; the
continuation in the service of such employer with such notice shall be
deemed a waiver by the employe of his right of action as aforesaid if
such employer shall give written notice to such employe or servant
that he has made such payment of premium into the state insurance
fund."
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thereby receive the benefits of the act for themselves and their
employees. The same provisions are made for the state and all
political subdivisions thereof.
1 7
(b) Nature of the Employment:
Assuming all of the tests of the prior sections are met, the
workman may still not recover compensation under the act un-
less he is "regularly" employed "in the usual course of trade,
business, profession or occupation of his employer," and such
employment must not be merely "casual." 18
One may immediately note, with displeasure, that these
terms are so nebulous as almost to defy description, and the
courts appear to have fruitlessly struggled to define them. Any
17 Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-716. (State and political subdivisions thereof
may contract with industrial commission to cover groups or persons not
considered employees under Section 1465-61; contract provisions; payment
of premiums; benefits payable; separate records to be kept.)
"If the state or any political subdivision thereof, including any
county, township, city, village, school district, and any institution or
agency of the state, shall employ, enlist, recruit, solicit or otherwise
secure the services of any organization, association or group of persons
and the members thereof, including volunteer firemen, civilian defense
workers and auxiliary policemen and patrolmen, the individual members
of which are not, by reason of such service, employees as defined in para-
graph 1 of Section 1465-61 of the General Code or if the state or any
political subdivision thereof shall desire to secure workmen's compensa-
tion in respect of any volunteer fireman, policeman, deputy sheriff,
marshal or deputy marshal, constable or other person in its service
in the event of the injury, disease or death of such person -while en-
gaged in activities called for by his position but not such as would
entitle such person to compensation as an employee as defined in para-
graph 1 of Section 1465-61 of the General Code subject however to the
limitations contained in the second sentence of paragraph 1 of section
1465-61 of the General Code the state or such political subdivision may
contract with the industrial commission for coverage of such persons
under the workmen's compensation law while in the performance of
such service. Such contract shall contain provisions for the determina-
tion of premiums, average weekly wages or their equivalent, and the
identity of the persons covered and such other provisions as may be
necessary in each case to establish or define the risk and determine
claims arising thereunder. Payment of premiums by the state or a
political subdivision shall be made in the manner as is provided with
respect to workmen's compensation premiums payable by the state or
a political subdivision and at such times as may be provided by such
contract. Upon execution of such contract, the persons covered thereby
shall be entitled to the same benefits, payable from the public fund,
which are accorded to employees as defined in paragraph 1 of section
1465-61 of the General Code.
"For the purpose of statistical and like information the industrial
commission shall keep a separate record of the experience of the in-
dividual risks and groups of similar risks under such contracts." Eft.
9-18-51.
"Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-61, par. 2; supra note 7.
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criticism of the unsuccessful efforts of the courts to define these
terms does not mean to imply that the results reached in the
cases are necessarily wrong, but rather that the legislative en-
actments employing such tools make the establishment of defini-
tive rules exceedingly difficult. It is not the Ohio law alone
which has seen fit to use this vague and uncertain language, and
thus put the courts to great stress to define their scope and mean-
ing.19 Perhaps legislative draftsmanship requires the use of
shorthand language, but the purpose of such use would appear
to be defeated when the courts are required to strain their
imaginations to explain the limitations intended by the language
used.
To compound the difficulty, the Ohio Legislature, in 1917,
amended paragraph 2 of Section 1465-6120 by substituting the
conjunctive "and" for the disjunctive "or" in the last clause,
which now reads:
"but not including any person whose employment is but
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business,
profession or occupation of his employer."
The courts' response to the subtle intendment of the legislature
was to leave the word "casual" in suspended inanimation, and
to hold that if the employment is within the usual course of the
trade, etc. of the employer it is "regular," and if it is "regular"
it is not "casual." 21 The necessary result of this syllogistic rea-
soning is that the words "regular" and "casual" are meaningless
in a practicable sense, and the test of coverage in this respect is
whether the work performed is within the usual course of the
trade, etc. of the employer's business. Perhaps an analysis of the
cases concerning these terms will serve to clarify the limitations
placed thereon by the courts.
In State ex rel. Bettman v. Christen22 the claimants were
painters who were injured when they fell from a scaffold while
in the employ of a painting and decorating contractor. The con-
tractor was amenable to the workmen's compensation act, but
had failed to comply. He resisted the assessment of compensation
awards against him on the ground that he was not an employer
See Anno's: 15 A. L. R. 735; 33 A. L. R. 1452; 60 A. L. R. 1195; 107 A. L. R.
934.
20107 Ohio Laws, 157.
"State ex tel. Bettman v. Christen, 128 Ohio St. 56, 190 N. E. 233 (1934).
"Ibid.
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within the contemplation of the Act at the time of the injuries.
The court, in holding the defendant liable, was called upon to
construe the meaning of the words "regular employment" and
"casual employment." The language of the court is significant:
"Under Section 1465-61, if the employee is regularly em-
ployed, he is an employee to be counted in the regular em-
ployment demanded under Section 1465-60 for the purpose
of fixing the status of the employer within the provisions of
the act. In other words, if a man is employed 'regularly,'
obviously his employer employs him 'regularly,' under the
wording of these sections.
"What then is regular employment, under Section 1465-
61?
"We cannot escape the significance of the fact that under
Section 1465-61, which defines an employee, the word 'reg-
ularly' has been further defined by the addition of the phrase
'but not including any person whose employment is but
casual and not in the usual course of trade, business, pro-'
fession or occupation of his employer.'
"Now 'casual,' according to the lexicographers, is the an-
tonym for 'regular.' The Century Dictionary defines 'casual'
as 'occasional: coming at uncertain times, or without regu-
larity, in distinction from stated or regular; incidental: as
casual expenses,' and this contradistinction in the terms is
emphasized by the statute, which, after stating that the
test of the status of the employee is that he be 'in the service
of any person . . . employing three or more workmen or
operatives regularly in the same business,' adds 'but not
including any person whose employment is but casual and
not in the usual course of trade, business, profession or oc-
cupation of his employer.'
"Under the familiar rule of expressio unius, any person
whose employment is not casual and is in the usual course
of trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer,
within this definite statutory provision, is regularly em-
ployed.
"Under the weight of authority as it now exists, the test
as to what constitutes 'casual' employment is not the length
of the employment, but the nature of the employment."
Leaving the Christen case for a moment, it may be well to go
on to other pronouncements of the courts before summarizing
the rules of limitation applied.
In Smith v. Brockamp,23 a carpenter was engaged to assist
in erecting an addition to a tavern and was injured in perform-
' 81 Ohio App. 381, 77 N. E. 2d 727 (1947).
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ing the work. In allowing the claim for compensation the court,
nonetheless, distinguished this case from the Christen case on its
facts, pointing out that in the Christen case the facts were
squarely within the concept of "usual course of trade, etc.," since
a painter was engaged to perform his work for a painting con-
tractor, but that in the Smith case a tavern keeper had engaged
the services of a carpenter. Nonetheless, the work performed
(increasing the tavern's facilities to accommodate more patrons)
was directly concerned with furthering the business of operating
a tavern. To exemplify its position, the court said:
"By way of illustration, if a lawyer, whose office is not
maintained in his residence, should employ three or more
workmen to build an addition thereto, the employees so
engaged would not be included in the coverage of the act,
but if, on the other hand, a physician, who uses his home for
the purpose of practicing his profession as well as for his
residence, employed three or more workmen to build an ad-
dition thereto, which would increase the facilities of his
practice, then such employees would be included in cover-
age." 2 4
The court, in its opinion, referred to the Kukes case2 5 as au-
thority for the proposition that a claimant is covered when his
employment is of the same business as that of his employer.2 6
In Holden v. Beebe Fuel Company27 a painter contracted
with a retail coal dealer to paint the buildings occupied by the
latter in its business. The court found that the claimant was an
independent contractor, and then held, gratuitously, that he was
only the "casual" employee of the company. This dictum by the
court was ignored in the Smith case,28 and does not accord with
the decision of that case.
The foregoing decisions would appear to establish three basic
rules for determination of whether the work performed is within
the "usual course of trade, business, profession or occupation of
the employer":
' Id. at 386.
"Industrial Commission v. Kukes, 53 Ohio App. 309, 4 N. E. 2d 988 (1935).
" In that case the owner of an orchard was held to be an employer within
the act, although the claimant was employed for a short time during the
season to pick apples.
"60 Ohio App. 430, 21 N. E. 2d 874 (1938).
"See comments respecting this decision in Smith v. Brockamp, 81 Ohio
App. 381, 394.
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(1) if the skill of the employee is in the same business as the
employer, he will be included in coverage (e.g. a painter
working for a painting contractor).
(2) if the work performed is in connection with a business
purpose of the employer, the injured workman will be
covered.
(3) if the work performed is not in same business as that
of the employer nor connected with a business purpose
of the employer, the injured workman will not be
covered.
Since the courts have placed no time limits on the period of
employment required to meet the qualification of "regular" em-
ployment29 and since that phraseology was held to be the an-
tonym of "casual" employment, the resultant confusion of
terminology has served, in effect, to make these words useless as
practical tools of operation. They may, therefore, be largely ig-
nored, since the courts have pitched their decisions solely upon
the "usual course of trade, etc." concept, which, in the last
analysis, seems to result in substantial justice within the scope
of the statutory intendment.
Two suggestions with regard to this paragraph of the statute
are herewith made:
(1) the statute should be rewritten, omitting completely
any reference to "regular" or "casual" employment,
since these words are useless as practical tools in the
operation of the statute, or
(2) the words "regular" and "casual" should be specifically
defined in the statute so as to give them a substantial
meaning in construing some valid legislative intent.
II. Interest in the Business or in a Corporation or Firm Owning
the Business as Affecting Right to Compensation:
Section 1465-60, Ohio General Code, provides that "any
member of a partnership, firm or association, who regularly per-
forms manual labor in or about a mine, factory or other estab-
lishment . . . shall be considered as a workman or operative in
determining whether or not such person, firm or private cor-
poration, or public service corporation has in its service three or
more workmen." 30 The corollary statute, however, Section 1465-
raIn Industrial Commission v. Kukes, 53 Ohio App. 309, 4 N. E. 2d 988(1935), the court said: "The length of time of employment of a claimant
is not controlling."
" Supra note 6.
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61, defining "employees," does not specifically include such per-
sons within its coverage. This omission has necessitated a judi-
cial determination as to whether such persons are to be included
in coverage under the act.
The courts of Ohio were first called upon to adjudicate the
question in McMillen v. Industrial Commission,3 1 where the
claimant was a member of a partnership composed of three per-
sons, whose business was the construction of roads. The part-
nership agreement provided that the claimant should devote all of
his time to the affairs of the company, and was to receive wages
for his work. While acting as foreman on a road construction
project he was injured, and made claim for compensation, which
was denied. The basis for the denial of compensation was that a
member of a partnership could not at the same time act in the
dual capacity of employer and employee, and was not, therefore,
included within the coverage of the act.
Subsequently, Section 1465-68, Ohio General Code,3 2 was
amended by adding thereto a provision specifically including
members of a partnership within the coverage of the Act if their
injury or death occurred while engaged in the partnership busi-
ness, and if they are paid a fixed compensation for their serv-
ices.33
In the case of Goldberg v. Industrial Commission 4 however,
the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the 1925 amendment provid-
ing for the inclusion of members of a partnership within the cov-
erage of the act was unconstitutional and void, since such mem-
bers of partnerships were at once an employer and employee, and
that the legislature was, therefore, without power to enact the
amendment. The decision was afrmed in Westenberger v. In-
dustrial Commission.3 5 The law of Ohio, therefore, with respect
'113 Ohio App. 310 (1920).
"111 Ohio Laws, 218.
"The 1925 amendment, read as follows: "Any member of a partnership,
firm or association composed of two or more individuals, who is paid a fixed
compensation for services rendered to the partnership, firm or association,
and the dependents of such as are killed in the course of employment,
wheresoever such injury has occurred, provided the same was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid such compensation and benefits as are provided
in case of other injured, diseased or killed employees by this act, provided
such partnership, firm or association includes in the payroll furnished by
it to the Industrial Commission the compensation of such member and
pays the premium based thereon."
"131 Ohio St. 399, 3 N. E. 2d 364 (1936).
135 Ohio St. 211, 20 N. E. 2d 252 (1939).
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to members of an unincorporated business organization, excludes
persons having an ownership interest therein from coverage
under the Act. The law is to the contrary, however, with respect
to employees of a corporation, irrespective of the degree of
ownership of the claimant.
The question presented for decision in Kuehnl v. Industrial
Commission36 was whether an officer, director and shareholder
of a corporation, injured while engaged in performing manual
labor for the corporation, was its employee and included in cov-
erage under the Act. Counsel for the Commission maintained
that the position of the claimant here was no different from
that of a member of an unincorporated business organization and
should not be included in coverage, relying upon the Goldberg
and Westenberger cases. The court awarded compensation to the
claimant, although he was the president and general manager of
the corporation and owner of one-half of the capital stock of
the corporation.
The distinctions drawn by the court between this situation
and one involving a member of a partnership were based on the
following grounds: (1) that the decisions in the Goldberg and
Westenberger cases related solely to members of a partnership
and did not preclude coverage of an employee of a corporation;
(2) that in a small corporation it is often necessary for execu-
tives to perform manual labor; (3) if the corporation had hired
another person to perform the work done by Kuehnl at the time
of his injury, such employee would have been included in cover-
age under the act; and (4) that the state, through the Industrial
Commission, had required the corporation to comply with the
law, had collected the premiums covering its payroll including
the wages of Kuehnl, which took away his right to recover for
his loss against the corporation.
It is interesting to note that with the exception of two judges,
the composition of the court which ruled on the Kuehnl case was
the same as that in the Goldberg and Westenberger cases. The
court, however, gave no signs of recanting on its decisions in the
partnership cases.
With the exception of the first ground for the court's decision
in the Kuehnl case, the others would seem to apply with equal
force to a member of an unincorporated association, and the
distinction is, at best, a tenuous one. For the very reasons stated
" 136 Ohio St. 313, 25 N. E. 2d 682 (1940).
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for the decision in the McMillen36* case one might well argue
that the result should have been just the converse. If the mere
intervention of the fiction of corporate entity would justify the
distinction in the minds of some, then the liberal social policy
underlying workmen's compensation would be defeated by un-
warranted legalism. Moreover, if an employee of a corporation
owned all of the capital stock of a corporation would he not in
actuality be both the employer and employee?
The Kuehnl case was followed in Hillenbrand v. Industrial
Commission,3 7 but the court went even further, and stated that
it could perceive of no justification for a distinction between an
officer of a corporation engaged in manual labor and one not so
engaged.38 This view of the court, however, may be disregarded
as obiter dictum, since one of the prime criteria laid down in
the Kuehnl case for inclusion in coverage was performance of
manual labor by the claimant.
III. Relation of the Act to Employees of
Independent Contractors or Subcontractors:
Although many of the workmen's compensation acts did not
originally include them, provisions have now been added in
every jurisdiction making "principals," "principal employers,"
"general contractors," and the like liable for compensation to
employees of independent contractors and subcontractors. Such
provisions vary in the different states, appearing in nearly as
many forms as there are jurisdictions.39
The chief purpose of provisions of this type is to protect the
employees of an independent contractor or subcontractor who
is not financially responsible, and to prevent employers from re-
lieving themselves of liability by doing through independent
contractors what they could not otherwise do through their own
employees.
"* Supra note 31.
" 72 Ohio App. 427, 52 N. E. 2d 547 (1943).
U Id. at 431: ". . it appears to this court that the references to manual labor,
payroll reports and premium payments in the Kuehnl case were and are
merely descriptive of the actual facts and were so used, and were not nor
intended to be used as words of limitation."
" For an exhaustive analysis of the multiplicity of rules applied by other
jurisdictions to this problem, see Anno's: 3 A. L. R. 1181; 34 A. L. R. 768;
58 A. L. R. 1467; 151 A. L. R. 1359; 152 A. L. R. 816; 166 A. L. R. 813.
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The Ohio Act provides that:
"every person in the service of any independent contrac-
tor or subcontractor who has failed to pay into the state in-
surance fund the amount of premium determined and fixed
by the industrial commission of Ohio for his employment
or occupation, or to elect to pay compensation direct to his
injured and to the dependents of his killed employees, as
provided in section 1465-69, General Code, shall be con-
sidered as the employee of the person who has entered into
a contract, whether written or verbal, with such independent
contractor unless such employees, or their legal representa-
tives or beneficiaries elect, after injury or death, to regard
such independent contractor as the employer." 40
The employee is thus given the option as to which of the two
he will hold liable for his compensable injury if neither has com-
plied with the requirements of the act. Where, however, the
independent contractor is amenable to the act and has complied
therewith, the employee of such independent contractor has no
such option.
The constitutionality of the statute was challenged in DeWitt
v. State ex rel. Crabbe,4 1 on the ground that the employee of an
independent contractor was in no sense the employee of the
original contractor, and that the statute imposed undue penalties
and burdens upon the original contractor. Conceding that fac-
tually the relationship of employer and employee did not exist
between the original contractor and the employee of the inde-
pendent contractor, the court, nonetheless, held the provision
constitutional and valid as within the legislative power; that it
was not an onerous and undue burden to place upon the original
contractor the responsibility of seeing to the independent con-
tractor's compliance with the provisions of the act; and that in a
sense the employee of an independent contractor may be con-
sidered as working in the business of and for the benefit of the
original contractor.
Where the independent contractor is amenable to the Act
and does comply therewith, his employees cannot be construed
to be the employees of the original contractor, and they are not
barred from bringing an action for common-law negligence
against the original contractor. This defense was unsuccessfully
raised by an original contractor in an action against him for
"Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-61, par. 3.
41108 Ohio St. 513, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 69 (1923).
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injuries sustained. The court, in Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Com-
pany v. Shackovsky,42 held that it is only in the event of the
sub-contractor or independent contractor not having complied
with the law by failing to pay into the compensation fund, that
the injured employee is deemed to be the employee of the orig-
inal contractor.
The theory upon which this rule proceeds is that the statute
is for the protection of the workman and not a shield for the
original contractor. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that
the claimant in the Trumbull case had previously been awarded
compensation by the industrial commission, but was, neverthe-
less, not barred from an additional recovery against the original
contractor with no set-off, as pro tanto recovery, allowed against
the industrial commission's award.
A somewhat different question arises, however, where the
independent contractor employs less than three workmen and is
not, therefore, amenable to the Act. The failure of the inde-
pendent contractor to comply with the provisions of the Act
under these circumstances does not give rise to the operation of
paragraph 3, Section 1465-61, Ohio General Code, and such em-
ployee is not regarded as the employee of the original contractor.
The court, in Industrial Commission v. Everett,43 in denying
compensation under these facts, pointed out that if the rule were
otherwise, it would give a single employee of an independent
contractor a right to compensation, but would give no compensa-
tion if he were an employee of a person, not an independent con-
tractor, employing less than three workmen.
The foregoing discussion, of course, relates solely to the
protection of employees of an independent contractor or sub-
contractor. But what of the coverage of the independent con-
tractor himself? An independent contractor is not an "employee"
within the contemplation of the Act, and is not, therefore, covered
by its provisions.44
Ohio has adopted the common-law test of "control" as the
means of determining whether the relationship is one of employee
" 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N. E. 306 (1924).
" 108 Ohio St. 369, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 868 (1923).
" Firestone v. Industrial Commission, 144 Ohio St. 398, 59 N. E. 2d 147(1945); Gillum v. Industrial Commission, 141 Ohio St. 373, 48 N. E. 2d 234(1943); Behner v. Industrial Commission, 154 Ohio St. 433, 96 N. E. 2d
403 (1951); Furlong v. First Presbyterian Church of Walnut Hills, 30 Ohio
N. P. (N. S.) 561 (1933).
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or that of independent contractor. Thus, the chief test in deter-
mining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor
is the right to control the manner or means of performing the
work.45 Obviously, the question of whether or not "control" has
been retained in sufficient degree is a question of fact to be
decided in each case as it arises.46 The control reserved must be
as to the manner and means of doing the work and not merely as
to the final result in order to negative the relationship of inde-
pendent contractor. 47
IV. Effect of Interstate Commerce and
Extraterritorial Employment:
(a) Effect of Interstate Commerce on Coverage:
It is now well established that the Federal Employer's Liabil-
ity Act 48 supersedes and excludes the application of state laws,
constitutional, statutory and common-law, including state work-
men's compensation acts, which might apply to the liability of an
interstate carrier for injury to its interstate commerce em-
" Bobik v. Industrial Commission, 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N. E. 2d 829 (1946);
Behner v. Industrial Commission, 154 Ohio St. 433, 96 N. E. 2d 403 (1951);
Gillum v. Industrial Commission, 141 Ohio St. 373, 48 N. E. 2d 234 (1943);
Firestone v. Industrial Commission, 144 Ohio St. 398, 59 N. E. 2d 147 (1945);
Industrial Commission v. Laird, 126 Ohio St. 617, 186 N. E. 718 (1933);
Fisher Body Co. v. Wade, 45 Ohio App. 263, 187 N. E. 78 (1933); Sands v.
Industrial Commission, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 570 (1933); Clifton v. Industrial
Commission, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 144 (1945).
'"See cases cited, notes 44 and 45 supra.
7 Gillum v. Industrial Commission, 141 Ohio St. 373, 382, 48 N. E. 2d 234
(1943), quoting from 27 Am. Jur. 488, Section 7:
"As a practical proposition, every contract for work to be done re-
serves to the employer a certain degree of control, at least to enable
him to see that the contract is performed according to specifications.
The employer may exercise a limited control over the work rendering
the employee a mere servant for a relation of master and servant is not
inferable from a reservation of powers which do not deprive the con-
tractor of his right to do the work according to his own initiative, so
long as he does it in accordance with the contract. The control of the
work reserved in the employer which effects a master-servant relation-
ship is control of the means and manner of performance of the work
as well as of the result; an independent contractor relationship exists
when the person doing the work is subject to the will of the employer
only as to the result, but not as to the means or manner of accomplish-
ment. Thus, a person employed to perform certain work is not neces-
sarily a mere servant because the contract provides that the work shall
be subject to the approval or satisfaction of the employer. Such a pro-
vision by the employer of the right to control the person employed as
to the details or method of doing the work, but is only a provision
that the employer may see that the contract is carried out according
to the plans."
45 U. S. C. §§ 51 et seq.
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ployees.4 9 And except where the workmen's compensation acts
expressly exclude from the application of the law employees of
carriers engaged in interstate commerce, the general rule is also
well settled that the state workmen's compensation acts are ap-
plicable to the claim of an injured employee who was not engaged
in interstate commerce at the time of injury, although the car-
rier is engaged generally in interstate commerce. This area was
not preempted by the Congress of the United States, and, there-
fore, the individual states have the power to legislate in this
field, including providing coverage under workmen's compen-
sation acts for employees of companies engaged in interstate
commerce but whose injuries result from purely intrastate ac-
tivities.
In the Minnesota Rate Cases" the United States Supreme
Court said:
"The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several states is supreme and plenary under the Constitution.
The reservation to the state to legislate on questions affect-
ing interstate commerce is only of such authority as is con-
sistent with and not opposed to the grant of Congress, a
grant which extends to every instrumentality or agency by
which interstate commerce may be carried on. No state may
impose a direct burden on interstate commerce; but within
certain limitations there remains to the states, until Con-
gress acts, a wide range for the exercise of the power appro-
priate to territorial jurisdiction although interstate com-
merce may be affected."
It remains then to observe what Ohio has done with respect
to its right to act in this field. Section 1465-98, Ohio General
Code,5 ' provides that coverage under the workmen's compensa-
Anno: 80 A. L. R. 1418.
230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1916).
Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-98:
"The provisions of this act shall apply to employers and employees
engaged in intrastate and also in interstate and foreign commerce, for
whom the rule of liability or method of compensation has been or maybe established by the Congress of the United States, only to the extent
that their mutual connection with intrastate work may and shall be
clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign com-
merce, and then only when such employer and any of his workmen
working only in this state, with the approval of the state liability board
of awards, and so far as not forbidden by any act of Congress, volun-
tarily accept the provisions of this Act by filing irritten acceptances,
which, when filed and approved by the board, shall subject the ac-
ceptors irrevocably to the provisions of this Act to all intents and pur-
poses as if they had been originally included in its terms, during the
period or periods for which the premiums herein provided have beenpaid. Payment of premiums shall be on the basis of the payroll of the
workmen who accept as aforesaid."
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tion act shall extend to all employers and employees engaged in
intrastate and interstate commerce except where a rule of lia-
bility or method of compensation has been provided by the Con-
gress of the United States. The intrastate character of the work
performed must be clearly separable from interstate activities.
Since the confines of the area in which this statute may operate
are rather loosely defined, undoubtedly intentionally so, an analy-
sis of the cases decided hereunder will disclose how this vague
concept has been translated into a particularity of detail.
In Spohn v. Industrial Commission,5 2 a resident of Ohio en-
tered into a contract of employment with a Michigan corporation
to act as an "over the road driver" between Michigan and Ohio.
Claimant was injured in Ohio, where all of the operations of the
company were purely interstate in character. In denying com-
pensation the court held that: "the purpose of the Ohio work-
men's compensation law is to protect Ohio workmen, but this
does not mean that the purpose of the law is to protect Ohio
citizens or residents. Both residence and citizenship are im-
material." 53 The court pointed out that while Congress had not
pre-empted the field, it did not consider a workman employed in
interstate commerce only, under a contract made outside of the
State of Ohio with a non-resident employer, an "Ohio workman"
within the contemplation of the Ohio Workmen's Compensation
Act. The court's decision was based upon two factors: (1) that
the work performed was purely interstate in character, and (2)
that the contract of employment was entered into in another
state. With respect to the second point, the court said: 5 4
"We are not here dealing with the rights of a workman
injured in Ohio while engaged in intrastate employment.
In this case, we are dealing with the rights of a workman
whose employment was transitory and confined exclusively
to interstate commerce . . . We see at once that where the
work to be done is confined to a single state, but is to be
performed in interstate commerce, the lex loci contractus
becomes an important consideration in determining whether
plaintiff, a resident of Ohio and injured in Ohio, has a right
to participate in the State Insurance Fund." 55
52 138 Ohio St. 42, 32 N. E. 2d 554 (1941).
,Id. at 49.
Id. at 47-8.
Emphasis is the writer's.
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But the lex loci contractus was largely minimized in the
case of Holly v. Industrial Commission.56 There the decedent
was a resident of Pennsylvania and had entered into a contract
of employment with a Pennsylvania corporation to work as a
truck driver, transporting freight in Ohio in both intrastate and
interstate commerce. The injury causing death occurred while
he was engaged purely in an interstate commerce activity in
Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court permitted the grant of compen-
sation, and distinguished this case from the Spohn case on two
grounds: first, that here the employer had actually qualified and
was paying premiums under the Ohio workmen's compensation
Act, whereas in the Spohn case the employer had not; and, as the
court in the Spohn case pointed out, since the employer there was
engaged solely in interstate commerce it was, therefore, not
amenable to the Act. Moreover, the court held that it could
not force Spohn's employer to comply with the Act, since this
would be an undue burden on interstate commerce. The second
distinguishing ground was that Holly was engaged in both inter-
state and intrastate commerce in Ohio, indiscriminately as his'
employer directed, while Spohn was engaged solely in interstate
commerce. The fact, however, that Holly was injured while en-
gaged solely in interstate commerce, the court held, did not af-
fect his right of recovery, since the employee was at other times
engaged in intrastate commerce. In this respect, the court said: 57
"... the fact that the services being performed by the
employee at the time of his injury were interstate in char-
acter is not controlling ... Under the definitive language of
Sections 1465-60 and 1465-61, Ohio General Code, an em-
ployee injured in the course of his employment is protected
and covered regardless of the nature of his employment-
whether interstate or intrastate in character-if his em-
ployer is within the provisions of the workmen's compensa-
tion law." 58
It is significant to note the shift of emphasis from the lex loci
contractus of the Spohn case to the compliance of the employer
in the Holly case. Although the latter factor does appear in the
Spohn case, it does not appear to be the point of emphasis in the
court's decision.
In Hall v. Industrial Commission,59 the claimant was em--
142 Ohio St. 79, 50 N. E. 2d 152 (1943).
Id. at 82.
Emphasis is the writer's.
'131 Ohio St. 416, 3 N. E. 2d 367 (1936).
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ployed as a porter by an Ohio corporation to perform services on
a bus line. The contract was entered into in Ohio, but the op-
eration of the bus line was solely in interstate commerce. The
claimant was injured outside the State of Ohio and while engaged
solely in an interstate activity. Compensation was allowed on
the grounds of the effect of the lex loci contractus and the fact
that Congress had not pre-empted the field, thus permitting the
operation of Section 1465-98. The employer had been amenable
to the Act in Ohio and had complied therewith. The Spohn case,
decided after the Hall case, was distinguished primarily on the
ground of the lex loci contractus.
The foregoing cases all concerned themselves with the effect
of interstate commerce where the crossing of state boundaries
were concerned. But what of the Ohio employee, working in
Ohio on equipment solely within the state and not across state
borders? Section 1465-980 provides for coverage only where
the work is intrastate in character and is "clearly separable and
distinguishable from interstate commerce." The question arose
in Klar v. Erie R. R. Company,"' where the plaintiff was engaged
in working on a freight car which, after being used for an inter-
state shipment of coal and thereafter unloaded, was on a side-
track awaiting disposition. The court held that the freight car,
while not in use, was in intrastate rather than interstate com-
merce. Compensation was, therefore, awarded by the industrial
commission. The plaintiff, however, was unsuccessful in at-
tempting a separate recovery from the defendant in this case on
grounds which are not relevant to the problem here discussed.
In general, the tests for ascertaining when employment is
interstate in character are set forth in Moore v. Industrial Com-
mission.62 One can, of course, conceive of countless situations in
" Note 51 supra.
118 Ohio St. 612 (1928).
" 49 Ohio App. 386, 197 N. E. 403 (1934). At pp. 390-1: "Whether the plain-
tiff was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury is to be
determined by the following rules:
1). The test of employment in interstate commerce, which determines
the application of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, is whether
the employee at the time of the injury was engaged in interstate
commerce, or in any work so closely related to it as to be practically
a part of it.
2). The tracks, bridges, roadbed and equipment of a carrier in actual
use in interstate commerce have a definite interstate character as
instruments of such commerce and give such character to those
employed on them. (Continued on following page.)
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which the facts would raise doubts as to whether the character of
the work performed was intrastate or interstate. Such situations
will have to be decided by the courts on their facts as they arise.63
(b) Extraterritorial Employment:
Unlike the cases involving interstate commerce, extraterri-
torial employment involves work purely intrastate in character,
but acts performed in other states by residents of Ohio. The
Holly case6 4 made it quite clear that residents of another state
are contemplated within the coverage of the Ohio Act where the
injury occurs in Ohio, and where the employer has complied with
the Ohio Act. But what of Ohio residents injured in purely
intrastate activities performed in another state?
In Industrial Commission v. Gardinio,6 5 a resident of Ohio
entered into a contract in Ohio with an Ohio corporation to per-
form services in Pennsylvania, where the employer was engaged
in the construction of a bridge. Claimant was injured in Penn-
sylvania and filed his claim with the Ohio commission. In deny-
ing compensation the court said: 66
"Surely the mere fact that the contract was entered into
in Ohio for services, none of which were to be performed
within this state, but in other states and countries, should
not bring the employee within the Ohio workmen's com-
pensation law unless the language of the statutes clearly
3). Equipment withdrawn from interstate commerce for repair does
not give an interstate character to the work of repairing it, if the
repair is a definite withdrawal from service and placement in new
relations and not merely a temporary interruption of such service.
4). An employee is within the Federal Employer's Liability Act if the
employment in which he is engaged at the time of his injury is an
incident to interstate commerce, even though it may be likewise
an incident to interstate commerce.
5). An employee engaged in clearing tracks on a right of way of a rail-
road company to facilitate the movement of interstate commerce is
engaged in interstate commerce.
6). As the power of Congress is restricted to the regulation of interstate
commerce, the question of whether the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, which regulates the liability of carriers engaged in interstate
commerce, is applicable, is a federal question, and the decisions
of the Federal Courts are controlling."
For a variety of fact situations in which the question has arisen, see
Annos: 80 A. L. R. 1418; 133 A. L. R. 956; 148 A. L. R. 873.
"Supra note 56. See also discussion in body of article.
119 Ohio St. 539, 166 N. E. 758 (1929).
"Id. at 543.
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol2/iss1/5
EMPLOYMENT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
so provides. The mere fact that the contract was made in
this state is not controlling." 67
However, a different result was reached in Prendergast v. In-
dustrial Commission,6" where an engineer was employed by an
Ohio company to work in several of its out of state offices. He
received directions from the company's home office and was in
constant communication with them. While the basic facts of this
case are substantially identical to that of the Gardinio case, the
court took a somewhat different view of the situation. In allow-
ing compensation to Prendergast, the court distinguished this
case from the Gardinio case on the ground that the facts were
different; that is to say, the State of Ohio had an interest in
Prendergast which was lacking in Gardinio, because "all of the
cost plus the profits on the goods sold by Prendergast flowed
back to Ohio to the benefit of his employer and to the economic
advantage of the state," 69 whereas this was not true of Gar-
dinio's services. Therefore, reasoned the court, Ohio had an
interest in Prendergast's economic welfare. "In other words,"
said the court, "an employee injured outside the state may re-
cover under the Ohio act if the employing industry and his rela-
tion thereto are localized in Ohio." 70
But the localization of interests in the Gardinio case were
no different from that of Prendergast. The profits accruing to
Gardinio's employer, an Ohio corporation, were no different
from those accruing to Prendergast's employer, and the court did
not state the fact to be that Gardinio's employer had no other
employees in Ohio who might benefit by the work performed in
Pennsylvania. Perhaps the court intended to recede somewhat
from the harsh result of the Gardinio case. If this be so, the
ground upon which its decision is pitched in the Prendergast
case would seem to have no validity since the workmen's com-
pensation act was not enacted for direct economic benefits to an
employer nor to the state's general economic welfare, but rather
for the protection of injured workmen. 7 1
Compare this application of lex loci contractus with that in the Hall and
Spohn cases, supra, notes 59 and 52.
136 Ohio St. 535, 27 N. E. 2d 235 (1940).
RId. at 543.
10 Ibid.
"A summation of the factors upon which courts have relied in determining
problems relating to extraterritorial employment appears in 50 HARvmw L.
REv. 1119, 1171: (Continued on following page.)
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V. Injuries Incurred in Maritime or Admiralty Activities:
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,72 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that the New York Workmen's Compensation
Law, which substituted a new remedy in lieu of that at common
law, was, as applied to an injury to a longshoreman, while un-
loading in New York an ocean-going steamship plying between
ports in different states, invalid as conflicting with Article 2,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, providing that the
judicial power of the United States should extend to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and conflicted also with
Article 1, Section 8, giving Congress power to make all laws
necessary to carry into execution the powers vested in the Fed-
eral Government, and with Judicial Code Sections 24 and 256,
giving the Federal District Courts exclusive judicial cognizance
of all civil causes in admiralty, saving to suitors in all cases the
right of the common-law remedies given. The court took the
position that Congress had the paramount power to fix and de-
termine the maritime law which should prevail throughout the
country.78
Subsequently, and undoubtedly because of the decision in
the Jensen case, the Federal Judiciary Act, giving the district
courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common
law is competent to give it" was amended by adding a clause
which read, "and to claimants the rights and remedies under
the workmen's compensation law of any state." It was thus pre-
"The decisions of courts frequently turn upon the relative importance
given to certain factors in a specific case, such as (1) the place of con-
tract of employment, supposedly carrying with it, as part of the con-
tract, the law of the state in which the contract was made; (2) the
specific provisions of the workmen's compensation act of the state of the
employer with reference to its extraterritorial operation; (3) the state
in which the employee's name and pay are included in payroll reports
submitted by the employer; (4) the place of the accident; (5) the
residence or domicile of the employee; (6) the place of the employee's
activities or performance of the work assigned; (7) the right of re-
covery outside the state of employment; (8) the relation of the em-
ployer's activities or performance of assigned work to the employer's
place of business, or situs of the industry; and (9) the place or state
having supreme governmental interest in the employee, as affecting
his social, business and political life."
244 U. S. 205, 61 L. Ed. 1086, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917).
The Supreme Court then reaffirmed its position, in Clyde S. S. Co. v.
Walker, 244 U. S. 255, 61 L. Ed. 1116, 37 S. Ct. 545 (1917).
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sumed that it was then constitutional to apply the state work-
men's compensation laws to matters of maritime jurisdiction.7 4
The Supreme Court then, in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart,7 5 was called upon to determine whether the amend-
ment to the Judicial Code was a lawful enactment by Congress
respecting jurisdiction in maritime matters. By a divided court,
it was held that Congress, in passing the amendment permitting
the application of the state workmen's compensation acts to
admiralty affairs, had exceeded its constitutional powers to legis-
late concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdic-
tion, the majority of the court holding that the act virtually de-
stroyed the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution con-
templated and established, concerning admiralty jurisdiction.76
So far, then, as the operation of the Ohio Workmen's Com-
pensation Act is concerned, it may, obviously, apply only to non-
maritime employment. The question of whether particular em-
ployment falls within the ambit of the Ohio act or is purely mari-
time in character must be a question of fact in each case. Only
two cases appear to have been decided in Ohio on this subject,
and compensation was denied in both as being employment of a
maritime character only.77 It is not inconceivable that work
performed on navigable waters may still not be purely maritime
4 Cimmino v. John T. Clark & Son, 184 App. Div. 745, 172 N. Y. Supp. 478
(1918); Ruddy v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 107 Misc. 199, 176 N. Y.
Supp. 731 (1919).
T 253 U. S. 149, 64 L. Ed. 834, 40 S. Ct. 438 (1920).
The dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, concurred in by Justices Pitney,
Brandeis and Clark, would give effect to the intention of Congress by up-
holding the act as within the constitutional power of Congress and ques-
tioned the soundness of the reasoning of the majority that this clause
violated the provision of the Constitution that the judicial power of United
States Courts should extend to all cases of admiralty jurisdiction, because
the act in question had the effect of making operative different rules in
different states. It was noted that the constitutional provision in question
merely defined the scope of the judicial powers of United States Courts
and, aside from the matter of jurisdiction, it appeared to have no reference
to the powers of Congress.
A similar, subsequent amendment, of June, 1922, was likewise held
unconstitutional in Farrel v. Waterman S. S. Co., 286 Fed. 284 (1923); and
the principle of the Knickerbocker Ice Co. case was reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U. S. 427, 71 L. Ed. 1135,
47 S. Ct. 695 (1927).
" Tyler v. Industrial Commission, 25 Ohio App. 444, 5 0. L. Abs. 262 (1927)
(fisherman killed when returning on waters of Lake Erie while assisting in
lifting nets out of the water); American Shipbuilding Co. v. Aros, 128 Ohio
St. 258, 191 N. E. 2d (1934).
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in character and, ergo, compensable, but such a fact situation
has not yet been the subject of successful litigation in the Ohio
courts.
VI. Minors:
Minors are now expressly included within coverage of the
act,78 and are deemed sui juris for the purposes thereof. 79 More-
over, coverage of minors is not affected by the fact that the minor
has been illegally employed. 0
VII. Policemen and Firemen:
Section 1465-61, paragraph 1, Ohio General Code, 1 provides
that policemen and firemen who are eligible to participate in a
pension fund established by municipal authority for their benefit
shall be excluded from coverage under the act, unless the amount
received from the pension fund is less than would have been
received in the absence of such a pension fund, in which case
the regular state compensation shall be awarded. The statute
appears to be quite clear in its coverage and meaning and would
seem to require no interpretation. However, several anomalous
situations have arisen which have required a judicial interpre-
tation of the statute.
In Industrial Commission v. Flynn,8 2 a fireman was killed in
an accident on his way to combat a fire. The City of Toledo had
a firemen's pension fund created under an ordinance of that
city. Regulations governing the fund provided that in order to
be eligible to participate, the particular fireman must be "per-
manently disabled, so as to render necessary his retirement
from all service in said fire division." Since injuries of such
severity are of comparatively rare occurrence, firemen of that
city, as a class, do not participate in the pension fund. As the
court pointed out: "A fireman in Toledo might sustain serious
burns or broken bones which would make him incapable of doing
any kind of work for a long period of time, and yet if he were not
permanently disabled in such degree as to cause his retirement
from the Toledo fire department he could not draw one penny
from the pension fund." 88 The commission contended that since
Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-61.
" Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-93.
go Ibid.
Supra note 7.
129 Ohio St. 220, 194 N. E. 420 (1935).
"Id. at 225.
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plaintiff was "eligible" to participate in the pension fund and
was, therefore, not an "employee" under the meaning of Section
1465-61, General Code, and not entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion; that in order to qualify him as an "employee" under that
section it must be first shown that he received a lesser amount
from the pension fund than from the State Insurance Fund.
The court, however, rejected the commission's contention
and awarded compensation. In so doing, the court said: s4
"Much depends upon the meaning to be accorded the
word 'eligible' as used in Section 1465-61. If we say that in-
jured firemen in the City of Toledo are eligible to participate
in the firemen's pension fund of that city because under cer-
tain extraordinary conditions they may receive an allow-
ance therefrom, the argument of counsel for the Industrial
Commission that Captain Flynn was not an employee under
Section 1465-61 should be followed. However, if we give
the word a broader and more comprehensive meaning in
harmony with the intent and spirit of the workmen's com-
pensation act, the right of the injured firemen as a class
actually to participate in a pension fund should be made to
test their eligibility to do so. It is the clear purpose of Sec-
tion 1465-61 in its present form dating from July, 1931 to
provide for injured firemen out of the State Insurance Fund
to the extent they are not provided for out of any pension
fund. So, under this section, if an injured fireman is paid
less from a pension fund than he would get as an injured
employee receiving compensation wholly from the State In-
surance Fund, the difference is paid from the State Insur-
ance Fund.
"In other words, the rights of injured firemen generally
to share in a pension fund, and not the right of a particular
injured fireman to do so, should constitute the test in deter-
mining their status." 85
The decision is quite liberal, but cannot be criticized on that
ground, since it accords with the general intent of the act. 6
Ibid.
Emphasis is the writer's.
"In an earlier case, Industrial Commission v. Cramer, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 408(1933), the Court of Appeals of Mahoning County ruled, on an identical
set of facts, that since the fireman had died rather than having been merely
injured, his beneficiary could not recover compensation from the State
Insurance Fund, since death of his decedent precluded participation in the
pension fund. The court held that under Section 1465-68, dependents of an
injured employee can recover or participate in the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Fund only when the injured employee was entitled to participate. Since
the killed fireman was not eligible to participate, his widow, likewise, could
not.
This decision has, of course, now been overruled by the Flynn case.
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In State ex rel. Cline v. Miller,8 7 it was held that a police
pension could not be paid to a widow after she had received a
maximum award from the industrial commission for the death of
her husband. The court held that Section 1465-61, Ohio General
Code, does not require the trustees of the fund to grant a pension
or provide that a pension shall be paid in addition to a maximum
award from the Workmen's Compensation Fund. The only pro-
vision of the statute is that if a pension to a policeman or fireman
amounts to less than he would have gotten under the workmen's
compensation act, the State Insurance Fund shall pay the dif-
ference.
VIII. Needy Persons Put to Work by Local Government:
In Industrial Commission v. McWhorter,"s compensation for
injury was sought by a person put to work by a municipality as
part of its relief program. In granting compensation, the court
noted that the work done by the claimant was the same as other
workmen in the employ of the city, under the same supervision.
The decision is based upon the thesis that it is socially imperative
to maintain the dignity of those unfortunate persons who were
and are required to apply for relief, 9 even though the court
largely conceded that it could not find the claimant an "em-
ployee" within the technical provisions of the Act. The following
excerpts from the Court's opinion are enlightening:
"Emphasis is laid upon the fact that claimant was an ob-
ject of the city's bounty, a ward, a charge. It is contended
that the relationship between the workman and the city
was due to circumstances and not the result of free, mutual
contract. It is stated there is no distinction between those
who receive work relief and those who receive direct relief.
... it may be stated that to treat relief workers as public
wards would weaken the incentive to accept work when it is
offered. The purpose of the law is to keep men occupied in
gainful occupations so that they may not become idle
paupers ...
"It seems to this court more in harmony with the spirit
of work-relief legislation to hold the claimant to be an em-
ployee than to hold him to be a pauper or a ward. A sound
public policy prompts the efforts of the state to preserve the
' 134 Ohio St. 445, 17 N. E. 2d 749 (1938).
129 Ohio St. 40, 193 N. E. 620 (1934).
For decisions of the courts of other states based upon a similar reasoning,
see Annos: 88 A. L. R. 711; 96 A. L. R. 1154; 127 A. L. R. 1483.
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self-reliance of its citizens, even if at extra expense. It is
important to preserve the character as to preserve the life of
its citizens. . . . The evolution of public welfare has been
from public 'charity' toward social justice. Courts should
facilitate such development by an enlightened and liberal
interpretation of all welfare laws."
Following the decision in the McWhorter case, the Ohio
Legislature passed the enactment commonly known as the
"Public Work-Relief Employees' Compensation Act." 90 Section
3496-2 provides that all sections of the Ohio General Code relat-
ing to the Workmen's Compensation Act shall apply to the
"Public Work-Relief Compensation Act," except as otherwise
provided. The sole exceptions relate to the nature of the reme-
dies provided, but not as to the basic nature of the compensation
awarded.
IX. Persons Impressed Into Service to Aid in Making Arrests:
Frequently a person is impressed into service to assist in
arresting a criminal offender. The test of whether an injury in-
curred in performing such services is compensable under the
act is two-fold: (1) there must be an emergency in existence at
the time of the impressment into service, and (2) the officer must
be one who has the legal capacity to create the employer-em-
ployee relationship.
In Industrial Commission v. Turek,9 1 a traffic policeman re-
quested the claimant, at 4: 00 o'clock P. M., to assist him later
that night in apprehending a supposed thief. In so doing, the
claimant was injured. Compensation was denied on the ground
that no emergency existed at the time of the request for as-
sistance, the impressment having taken place many hours prior
to the apprehension of the thief. However, in Mitchell v. In-
dustrial Commission,92 a deputy sheriff impressed the claimant
into service with the words, "in the name of the law, you are a
deputy sheriff." In attempting to apprehend the alleged "dan-
gerous character," the claimant was injured. Workmen's com-
pensation was granted to the claimant. The court pointed out
that by virtue of the provisions of Section 2833, Ohio General
Code, a deputy sheriff has the authority, in a case of emergency,
"Ohio General Code, Sees. 3496-1 to 3496-16, inclusive. (Effective May 17,
1931.)
129 Ohio St. 545, 196 N. E. 382 (1935).
"57 Ohio App. 319, 13 N. E. 2d 736 (1936).
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to call persons to his aid in making an arrest. This question was
not discussed in the Turek case, which this court distinguished
on the ground that here the claimant was impressed in service in
an emergency.
In Stoeckel v. Industrial Commission,93 compensation was
denied to the claimant, who was injured in attempting to appre-
hend a fugitive in response to the call of a police officer of a
municipality to "stop that man." This case was distinguished
from the Mitchell case on the ground that the policeman, unlike
the deputy sheriff in the Mitchell case, had no authority to make
any person an "employee" of the municipality.
X. Employees Engaged in Farming:
Since Sections 1465-60 and 1465-61, Ohio General Code, are
extremely broad in their language,94 and do not specifically ex-
clude farm laborers and their employers, they are, presumably,
included within the coverage of the act. The question, however,
does not appear to have been litigated in Ohio. Farm laborers
do not fall within the coverage of the great majority of the work-
men's compensation acts of other states, 95 and their exclusion
from coverage under those acts has been upheld as constitutional
on the ground that such exclusion does not constitute an arbitrary
and unreasonable classification.9
XI. Domestic Employees:
Domestic employees are expressly excluded from coverage
under the act by Section 1465-61. 97
"77 Ohio App. 159, 66 N. E. 2d 776 (1945).
"Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-60 includes within its compass "all private
employers."
See Anno: 7 A. L. R. 1296.
"Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Col. 686, 151 Pac. 398 (1915);
Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N. W. 1037 (1915);
Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308 (1911); Mackin v. Detroit-
Timken Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49 (1915); Mathison v. Minneapolis
Street R. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71 (1914); Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I.
484, 96 AtI. 340 (1916); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96,
185 S. W. 556 (1916), aff'd. 249 U. S. 152, 63 L. Ed. 527, 39 S. Ct. 227 (1919).
IT Supra note 7.
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